Shareholder Theory/Shareholder Value

Shareholder theory states that the primary objective of management is to maximize shareholder value. This objective ranks in front of the interests of other corporate stakeholders, such as employees, suppliers, customers, and society.Shareholder theory argues that shareholders are the ultimate owners of a corporate’s assets, and thus, the priority for managers and boards is to protect and grow these assets for the benefit of shareholders. Shareholder theory assumes that shareholders value corporate assets with two measurable metrics, dividends and share price. There-fore, management should make decisions that maximize the combined value of dividends and share price increases. However, shareholder theory fails to consider that shareholders and corporates may have other objectives that are not based on financial performance. For example, as early as1932, Berle and Means argued that corporations have a variety of purposes and interests including encouraging entrepreneurship, innovation, and building communities. This wider view is gaining more traction in recent decades as evidenced by an increased interest in ethical investment funds.This suggests that shareholders and potential shareholders are not only interested in financial gains but are also interested in corporates being socially responsible (Kyriakou2018). Therefore shareholder value creation is important; however,it needs to be balanced with other stakeholders’ interests. This is referred to as an enlightened approach to shareholder value maximization

The theory of international business: the role of economic models

This paper reviews the scope for economic modelling in international business studies. It argues for multi-level theory based on classic internalisation theory. It present a systems approach that encompasses both firm-level and industry-level analysis

The consumer scam: an agency-theoretic approach

Despite the extensive body of literature that aims to explain the phenomenon of consumer scams, the structure of information in scam relationships remains relatively understudied. The purpose of this article is to develop an agency-theoretical approach to the study of information in perpetrator-victim interactions. Drawing a distinction between failures of observation and failures of judgement in the pre-contract phase, we introduce a typology and a set of propositions that explain the severity of adverse selection problems in three classes of scam relationships. Our analysis provides a novel, systematic explanation of the structure of information that facilitates scam victimisation, while also enabling critical scrutiny of a core assumption in agency theory regarding contract design. We highlight the role of scam perpetrators as agents who have access to private information and exercise considerable control over the terms and design of scam relationships. Focusing on the consumer scam context, we question a theoretical assumption, largely taken for granted in the agency literature, that contact design is necessarily in the purview of the uninformed principal

Key issues in the design of pay for performance programs

Pay for performance (P4P) is increasingly being used to stimulate healthcare providers to improve their performance. However, evidence on P4P effectiveness remains inconclusive. Flaws in program design may have contributed to this limited success. Based on a synthesis of relevant theoretical and empirical literature, this paper discusses key issues in P4P-program design. The analysis reveals that designing a fair and effective program is a complex undertaking. The following tentative conclusions are made: (1) performance is ideally defined broadly, provided that the set of measures remains comprehensible, (2) concerns that P4P encourages "selection" and "teaching to the test" should not be dismissed, (3) sophisticated risk adjustment is important, especially in outcome and resource use measures, (4) involving providers in program design is vital, (5) on balance, group incentives are preferred over individual incentives, (6) whether to use rewards or penalties is context-dependent, (7) payouts should be frequent and low-powered, (8) absolute targets are generally preferred over relative targets, (9) multiple targets are preferred over single targets, and (10) P4P should be a permanent component of provider compensation and is ideally "decoupled" form base payments. However, the design of P4P programs should be tailored to the specific setting of implementation, and empirical research is needed to confirm the conclusions

The Past and Future of Evolutionary Economics : Some Reflections Based on New Bibliometric Evidence

This document is the Accepted Manuscript version of the following article: Geoffrey M. Hodgson, and Juha-Antti Lamberg, ‘The past and future of evolutionary economics: some reflections based on new bibliometric evidence’, Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, first online 20 June 2016. The final publication is available at Springer via doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40844-016-0044-3 © Japan Association for Evolutionary Economics 2016The modern wave of ‘evolutionary economics’ was launched with the classic study by Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter (1982). This paper reports a broad bibliometric analysis of ‘evolutionary’ research in the disciplines of management, business, economics, and sociology over 25 years from 1986 to 2010. It confirms that Nelson and Winter (1982) is an enduring nodal reference point for this broad field. The bibliometric evidence suggests that ‘evolutionary economics’ has benefitted from the rise of business schools and other interdisciplinary institutions, which have provided a home for evolutionary terminology, but it has failed to nurture a strong unifying core narrative or theory, which in turn could provide superior answers to important questions. This bibliometric evidence also shows that no strong cluster of general theoretical research immediately around Nelson and Winter (1982) has subsequently emerged. It identifies developmental problems in a partly successful but fragmented field. Future research in ‘evolutionary economics’ needs a more integrated research community with shared conceptual narratives and common research questions, to promote conversation and synergy between diverse clusters of research.Peer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio